Complaint Filed by Marsha a Kerr Against Rocket Mortgage, LLC with Jury Demand. Plaintiff Requests Summons Issued. Receipt No: AMIEDC-10660531 - Fee: $ 405. County of 1st Plaintiff: Outside State - County Where Action Arose: Wayne County - County of 1st Defendant: Wayne County. [Previously Dismissed Case: No] [Possible Companion Case (s): None] (Badwan, Mohammed)

Document #1 Filed 03/27/2026 · 9 pages · District Court, E.D. Michigan · View original PDF

NATURE OF THE ACTION

1Plaintiff brings this action seeking redress for Defendant’s violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”), 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq., and the Maryland Consumer Protection Act (“MCPA”), Md. Code Comm. Law § 13-101 et seq.

2“The primary purpose of the TCPA was to protect individuals from the harassment, invasion of privacy, inconvenience, nuisance, and other harms associated with unsolicited, automated calls.” Parchman v. SLM Corp., 896 F.3d 728, 738-39 (6th Cir. 2018) citing Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-243, § 2, 105 Stat. 2394 (1991).

3As the Supreme Court hs observed, “Americans passionately disagree about many things. But they are largely united in their disdain for robocalls.” Barr v. Am. Ass’n of Political Consultants, 140 S. Ct. 2335, 2343 (2020).

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

4The Court has federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 as the TCPA is a federal statute.

5This Court has supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1367

6Venue in this district is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2) as the Defendant resides in this judicial district.

PARTIES

7Plaintiff is a natural person, over 18-years-of-age, who at all times relevant resided in Frederick, Maryland.

8Defendant is a national mortgage loan lender, originator, and servicer.

9Defendant maintains its principal place of business in Detroit, Michigan.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

10At all times relevant, Plaintiff was the sole operator, possessor, and subscriber of the cellular telephone number ending in 7789.

11At all times relevant, Plaintiff’s number ending in 7789 was assigned to a cellular telephone service.

12At all times relevant, Plaintiff was financially responsible for her cellular telephone equipment and services.

13In 2019, Plaintiff applied for and was issued a mortgage loan by Rocket Mortgage (“subject debt”).

14Plaintiff’s mortgage payments are due on 15th of each month.

15Since 2019, Defendant began placing collection calls to Plaintiff’s cellular phone prior to the payment deadline of the 15th of each month.

16In the calls that Plaintiff did not answer, Defendant left prerecorded voicemails (“robocalls”) on Plaintiff’s cellular phone stating:

“Hello this is Rocket Mortgage servicing. The status of your loan has now changed. Your mortgage requires your immediate attention. It’s critical you log into your Rocket Mortgage account today to review your options as payments are due and have impacted your loan. You can also call us at (800) 965-3611 to discuss your next steps. Thank you.”

17It was clear to Plaintiff that Defendant’s voicemails utilized an artificial and/or prerecorded voice because (1) all voicemails contained the identical message; (2) all voicemails were precisely the same duration; (3) the voicemails were all monotone and were conspicuously not left by a live representative; (4) none of the voicemails identified Plaintiff by name; and (5) all voicemails referred Plaintiff to the same toll-free number.

18Fed up with Defendant’s invasive robocalls, Plaintiff answered multiple calls and requested that Defendant cease its collection calls.

19Despite Plaintiff’s requests that the robocalls cease, Defendant continued placing robocalls to Plaintiff’s cellular phone.

20In total, Defendant has placed no less than fifty (50) robocalls calls to Plaintiff’s cellular phone after Plaintiff initially requested that the calls cease.

21Defendant’s invasive robocalls invaded Plaintiff’s privacy and caused Plaintiff damages, including: aggravation that accompanies unwanted phone calls, increased risk of personal injury resulting from the distraction caused by the phone calls, nuisance, annoyance, wear and tear to Plaintiff’s cellular phone, loss of battery charge, loss of concentration, mental anguish, the per-kilowatt electricity costs required to recharge Plaintiff’s cellular telephone as a result of increased usage of Plaintiff’s telephone, and wasting Plaintiff’s time.

22Moreover, each time Defendant placed a phone call to Plaintiff’s cellular phone, Defendant occupied Plaintiff’s cellular phone such that Plaintiff was unable to receive other phone calls or otherwise utilize her cellular phone while her phone was ringing.

23Due to Defendant’s refusal to honor Plaintiff’s requests that the calls cease, Plaintiff was forced to retain counsel to compel Defendant to cease its abusive collection practices.

CLASS ALLEGATIONS

24All previous paragraphs are expressly adopted and incorporated herein as though fully set forth herein.

25Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3) individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated (“Putative Class”) defined as follows:

All individuals in the United States (1) to whom Defendant or a third party acting on Defendant’s behalf, placed, or caused to be placed, a call; (2) directed to a number assigned to a cellular telephone service; (3) using an artificial or prerecorded voice; (4) without the individual’s consent; (5) within the four years preceding the date of this complaint through the date of class certification.

26The following individuals are excluded from the Putative Class: (1) any Judge or Magistrate Judge presiding over this action and members of their families; (2) Defendant, Defendant’s subsidiaries, parents, successors, predecessors, and any entity in which Defendant or their parents have a controlling interest and their current or former employees, officers and directors; (3) Plaintiff’s attorneys; (4) individuals who properly execute and file a timely request for exclusion from the Putative Class; (5) the legal representatives, successors or assigns of any such excluded individuals; and (6) individuals whose claims against Defendant have been fully and finally adjudicated and/or released.

Numerosity

27Upon information and belief, the members of the Putative Class are so numerous that joinder of them is impracticable.

28The exact number of the members of the Putative Class is unknown to Plaintiff at this time and can only be determined through targeted discovery.

29The members of the Putative Class are ascertainable because the Class is defined by reference to objective criteria.

30The members of the Putative Class are identifiable in that their names, addresses, and telephone numbers can be identified in business records maintained by Defendant.

Commonality and Predominance

31There are many questions of law and fact common to the claims of Plaintiff and the Putative Class.

32Those questions predominate over any questions that may affect individual members of the Putative Class.

Typicality

33Plaintiff’s claims are typical of members of the Putative Class because Plaintiff and members of the Putative Class are entitled to damages as a result of Defendant’s conduct.

Superiority and Manageability

34This case is also appropriate for class certification as class proceedings are superior to all other available methods for the efficient and fair adjudication of this controversy.

35The damages suffered by the individual members of the Putative Class will likely be relatively small, especially given the burden and expense required for individual prosecution.

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