Memorandum Opinion. Signed by Chief Judge Elizabeth K. Dillon on 05/27/2026

preliminary injunction. (Dkt. No. 3.) The matter has been fully briefed and argued before the court. For the reasons that follow, the court will decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction

1 The Equal Protection claim is asserted solely on behalf of S.P., while the two Virginia state-law claims are asserted on behalf of all three plaintiffs.

over the Virginia state-law religious freedom claims and will deny the Palmers’ motion for a preliminary injunction as to the federal Equal Protection claim.

S.P. is a homeschooled ninth-grade student. (Compl. ¶ 1, Dkt. No. 1.) Mr. and Mrs. Palmer have chosen to educate S.P. at home primarily because of their religious beliefs as “Bible-believing Christians.” (Id. ¶ 32.) Specifically, they allege that “[t]heir religious beliefs lead them to home school their children because they believe it provides the best opportunity for them as parents to incorporate the Bible and Christian discipleship throughout the day, which they believe is commanded in Scripture.” (Id.)

S.P. is a distance runner who competed in track & field and cross country throughout middle school, both individually and as part of a homeschool team. (Id. ¶¶ 35–36.) By participating in official events in middle school, S.P. “was able to log his official times with MileStat.com, which enabled him to track his progress by memorializing official run times that colleges are able to view for the purpose of recruiting and offering scholarships.” (Id. ¶ 44.) S.P. aspires to be a college runner and to earn a scholarship for track & field and/or cross country after finishing high school. (Id. ¶ 47.)

Now a high school student, S.P. has been denied the ability to compete in public-school track & field and cross-country events solely because he is homeschooled. (Id. ¶ 51.) This is because VHSL, the governing body of Virginia public high school interscholastic sports, has a policy that prohibits homeschooled students from participating in VHSL-sponsored interscholastic competitions. (Id. ¶¶ 52–55.) This policy, which is part of VHSL’s 2025–26 Handbook and Policy Manual, is approved by all VHSL member schools. RCSB is the public body that operates the public school system for Roanoke County, Virginia—where the Palmers

Pageid#: 151

reside—and is a member of VHSL, thus adopting its rule prohibiting homeschooled students from participating in public high school sports. (Id. ¶¶ 7, 56–57.) At the same time, however, VHSL permits many other categories of students to participate in interscholastic high school athletics, including private school students who meet certain criteria; students attending Virginia Governor’s Schools that do not offer a student’s desired sport, who may compete for their local public school associated with their residence; students assigned by a school board to nonmember schools, who may compete for the high school serving the school district in which his/her parents reside; and students who attend public school 100% virtually at home through Virginia’s Multidivision Online Provider Program. (Id. ¶¶ 58–62.)

The Palmers allege that this policy is exclusionary, discriminatory, and continues to cause him irreparable harm. (Id. ¶ 69.) Specifically, they contend that the policy violates the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution, the Free Exercise Clause in Article I, Section 16 of the Constitution of Virginia, and the VRFRA. The Palmers assert that, without the ability to participate in VHSL competitions, S.P. “has no way of logging official running times that can be verified and viewed by colleges” and, therefore, “has no generally accepted way of proving his running abilities to college recruiters.” (Id. ¶ 46.) They also allege that, without access to VHSL-sanctioned events, he lacks any viable opportunity to engage in competitive running with his peers. (Id. ¶ 48.) In addition, the Palmers allege that competitive athletics forms part of the treatment and management of S.P.’s medical condition. (Id. ¶ 49.) Specifically, they contend that “competing and goal-setting, and meeting certain goals is a key part of helping him successfully manage his medical condition because of what happens in a real race that cannot be simulated otherwise, including the adrenaline, motivation, and competition.” (Id. ¶ 50.)

Pageid#: 152

The Palmers seek relief permitting S.P. to compete on, or at a minimum try out for, his local public high school track & field and cross-country teams as other students in his district are allowed to do. Alternatively, they seek permission for S.P. to compete individually in certain events as an “unattached” runner. The Palmers request preliminary and permanent injunctive relief enjoining defendants from enforcing VHSL’s exclusionary policy against him. (Id. ¶¶ 66–69; id. at 16.)

As noted above, the Palmers bring three claims against defendants: (1) a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection claim; (2) a Free Exercise of Religion Claim under Article I, Section 16 of the Constitution of Virginia; and (3) a VRFRA claim under Virginia Code § 57–2.02. The court has federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 as to the Equal Protection claim, and supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 as to the Virginia state-law claims. However, district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under certain circumstances. Therefore, before evaluating the preliminary injunction motion, the court will first determine whether it will exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the two Virginia state-law claims. A. Virginia State-Law Religious Claims

The Palmers’ Virginia Constitutional claim and the VRFRA claim are distinct, but closely related. In both claims, the Palmers contend that the exclusionary policy unlawfully burdens their religious exercise by denying S.P. the opportunity to participate in interscholastic track & field and cross-country competitions because they homeschool him for religious reasons. They contend that their decision to educate S.P. at home is motivated by sincere religious convictions, and that the policy denies him a public benefit available to other students in the

Pageid#: 153

district. The complaint further alleges that Virginia law requires defendants to accommodate, rather than burden, the Palmers’ religiously motivated educational choices. (Compl. ¶¶ 78–90.) The Palmers allege that defendants have not shown that the policy is both “essential to further a compelling governmental interest” and “the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.” (Id. ¶ 91.) Because these claims raise novel questions of Virginia state law and the claims substantially predominate over the Equal Protection claim, the court will decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over them.

(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law, (2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which the district court has original jurisdiction, (3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction, or (4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). “Once any of these factors is satisfied, the district court possesses the discretion to dismiss supplemental claims[.]” Ameritox, Ltd. v. Millennium Labs., Inc., 803 F.3d 518, 532 (11th Cir. 2015); see also Hunter by Conyer v. Est. of Baecher, 905 F. Supp. 341, 343 (E.D. Va. 1995) (noting that the language of § 1367(c) is discretionary). The Supreme Court has emphasized that “when deciding whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, ‘a federal court should consider and weigh in each case, and at every stage of the litigation, the values of judicial

Pageid#: 154