Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction ( Motion Docket Date 7/17/2026.), Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim by City of Houston, Officer Hernandez, Filed. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1) (Azadeh, Melissa)

Plaintiff only has standing to sue the City Defendants for the alleged temporary emergency detention and transport to Ben Taub Hospital. The Plaintiff has no right to a police investigation of reported crimes, and the complaint has not alleged he was denied one. The pleadings do not support a claim against the City Defendants for actions by the hospital or medical staff, including the forcible administration of drugs and involuntary commitment. State law imposes specific duties and grants powers exclusively to medical or mental health professionals and the state to hold individuals under Chapter 573, Texas Health and Safety Code, not the City or its officers. The Texas Public Information Act (TPIA) does not create a private cause of action for damages for alleged violations, or for prospective relief against the City, and the complaint does not allege any violation of the TPIA.

The City cannot be liable under a theory of respondeat superior as Plaintiff expressly attempts here, nor can it be liable for the actions of the County hospital and its personnel which the City neither controlled nor employed. Plaintiff temporary detention and transport to hospital for assessment was lawful under section 573.001, as confirmed by medical assessments and the probable cause for involuntary commitment found by a probate court judge. Plaintiff does not allege any Fourteenth Amendment deprivation of substantive or procedural due process or ADA violation against the City Defendants. Plaintiff cannot meet his burden to overcome Officer Hernandez’s qualified immunity.

12(b)(1) Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) requires that a court dismiss a claim if the court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). "The burden of proof for a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss is on the party asserting jurisdiction." Id. Indeed, a presumption against subject matter jurisdiction exists that “must be rebutted by the party bringing an action to federal court.” Coury v Prot, 85 F3d 244, 248 (5th Cir 1996). "Lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be found in any one of three instances: (1) the complaint alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record; or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court's resolution of disputed facts." Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001) (per curiam). Discretion also exists to weigh any competing evidence based on credibility assessments. Williamson v Tucker, 645 F2d 404, 413 (5th Cir 1981) (citation omitted). Unlike a court considering a Rule 12(b)(6) or Rule 56 motion, district courts have a "unique power . . . to make factual findings which are decisive of [subject matter] jurisdiction" when considering a motion under Rule 12(b)(1) that raises questions of fact relevant to subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 412-13. Rule 12(b)(6)

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a plaintiff is generally required to plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Floyd v. City of Kenner, 351 F. App'x 890, 892-93 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)); FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Floyd, 351 F. App'x at 892-93. "Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. “‘[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged – but it has not ‘shown’ – ‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Gonzalez v. Kay, 577 F.3d 600, 603 (5th Cir. 2009) (emphasis added); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. The court accepts all well-pled facts as true, drawing "all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party." Harmon v. City of Arlington, Texas, 16 F.4th 1159, 1162-63 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting Morgan v. Swanson, 659 F.3d 359, 370 (5th Cir. 2011) (en banc)). “But the court does not ‘presume true a number of categories of statements, including legal conclusions; mere labels; threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action; conclusory statements; and naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.’ Id.” Armstrong v. Ashley, 60 F.4th 262, 269 (5th Cir. 2023).

Complaints in a section 1983 action subject to the defense of qualified immunity are subject