Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim by Valeria M. Contreras, M.D., Filed. Motion Docket Date 7/17/2026. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Proposed Order) (Goodman, Colin)

1)

Can Plaintiff bring claims against Defendant under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging constitutional violations when Defendant was not acting under color of state law?

2)

Can Plaintiff bring a claim for constitutional violation related to use of restraints when Defendant used professional judgment in her decision regarding restraints?

3)

Can Plaintiff bring a claim for constitutional violation related to fabrication of evidence in a Certificate of Medical Examination for Emergency Detention when his Complaint indicates the facts were true?

4)

Can Plaintiff bring a Section 1983 claim against Defendant when the claims constitute state-law governed healthcare liability claims?

Under Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, after the pleadings are closed but within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(c). "A motion brought pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c) is designed to dispose of cases where the material facts are not in dispute and a judgment on the merits can be rendered by looking to the substance of the pleadings and any judicially noticed facts." Hebert Abstract Co., Inc. v. Touchstone Properties, Ltd., et al., 914 F.2d 74, 76 (5th Cir.1990)(per curiam)(citation omitted); See also Voest-Alpine Trading USA Corp. v. Bank of China, 142 F.3d 887, 891 (5th Cir.1998).

The standard to be applied when analyzing a Rule 12(c) motion is identical to the standard used for a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). See In re Great Lakes Dredge & Cock Co. LLC, 624 F.3d 201, 209 (5th Cir. 2010); Guidry v. American Public Life Insurance Co., 512 F.3d 177, 180 (5th Cir.2007); Jones v. Greninger, 188 F.3d 322, 324 (5th Cir.1999).

In construing a motion pursuant to Rule 12(c), the court must “accept all well- pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Jones v. Greninger, 188 F.3d at 324; see Guidry v. American Public Life Insurance Co., 512 F.3d at 180. “The plaintiff must plead ‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A plaintiff’s claim is plausible if the factual allegations show that the plaintiff is entitled to relief on a more than speculative basis. In re Great Lakes Dredge & Cock Co. LLC, 624 F.3d at 210; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

In a 12(c) motion, the Court should not look beyond the pleadings, “any documents attached to the pleadings, and any documents attached to the motion that are central to the claim and referenced by the complaint.” Lone Star Fund V (U.S.), L.P. v. Barclays Bank PLC, 594 F.3d 383, 387 (5th Cir.2010); Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498-99 (5th Cir.2002). A plaintiff cannot rely on conclusory statements, unwarranted factual inferences, or legal conclusions to defeat a 12(c) motion. Gentilello v. Rege, 627 F.3d 540, 544 (5th Cir.2010). Complaints “’must contain either direct allegations on every material point necessary to sustain a recovery . . . or contain allegations from which an inference fairly may be drawn that evidence on these material points will be introduced at trial.’” Campbell v. City of San Antonio, 43 F.3d 973, 975 (5th Cir.1995) (quoting 5 Wright & Miller, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §1216, at 156-159 (2d ed. 1990)). C.

Plaintiff asserts two causes of action against Defendant: (1) Fourteenth Amendment violation due to Defendant’s decision to administer chemical restraints; and (2) Fourteenth Amendment violation due to Defendant’s execution of a Certificate of Medical Examination for Emergency Detention with alleged fabricated evidence. Both causes of action fail because Defendant was not acting under the color of state law.

Even if Defendant was acting under the color of state law, Plaintiff failed to plead sufficient facts to allow the Court to find that either action by Defendant constituted a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Finally, Plaintiff asserts a state-law healthcare liability claim against Defendant. He improperly recasts the healthcare liability claim as a constitutional violation. This Court should dismiss Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims against Defendant as improperly recast healthcare liability claims.

A.

Plaintiff’s Lawsuit Must be Dismissed Against Defendants for Failure to State Constitutional Claims Under Which Relief Can be Granted.

Plaintiff’s Complaint concludes, without identifying how, that Defendants were acting under the color of state law. Instead, Plaintiff only claims, without any support, that Defendant “acted under color of state law as employees, agents, or contractors of Harris Health carrying out the State’s involuntary commitment statutes…”

Defendant was employed by Baylor College of Medicine as an Associate Professor at the time of Plaintiff’s allegations and was not employed by Harris Health. Exhibit A. Further, as will be shown in more detail below, a private person does not act under color of state law simply because they contract with a state entity. See Allard v. Quinlan Pest Control Co. Inc., 2011 WL 5025149, *5 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 14, 2011) (“District courts in this circuit have... held that a private, independent contractor does not become a state actor by virtue of being hired by the state.”); Hatton v. Henderson Cty. Jail, 2009 WL 2744896 *6 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 24, 2009); Plummer v. Valdez, 2006 WL 2713784 *2 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 21, 2006). Taking Plaintiff’s pleading as true, that Defendant was an employee, agent, or contractor of Harris Health, does not automatically confer state actor status on her.

Plaintiff must allege facts that show that the deprivation of constitutional rights occurred under color of state law. See Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155 (1978). A private party, such as Defendant, will only be considered a state actor in rare circumstances. See Harvey v. Harvey, 949 F.2d 1127, 1130 (11th Cir. 1992). Courts have considered a private individual as a state actor under one of two theories: (1) the private individual was implementing an official government policy; or (2) the private individual’s actions were fairly attributable to the government. See Rundus v. City of Dall., Tex., 634 F.3d 309, 312 (5th Cir. 2011).

Regarding the first theory, Plaintiff included no facts related to an official government policy. His allegations come down to two actions by Defendant: (1) Defendant