Reply to Response to Motion re 4 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim in Lieu of Answer by Ronald Campurciani, Rhonda Faust, Bucky Goodale, Tracey Jerome, Town of Mooresville, North Carolina. (Stewart, Jake)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA STATESVILLE DIVISION Civil Action No. 5:26-cv-00076 PAUL ALEXANDER EXON, Plaintiff, v. TOWN OF MOORESVILLE, NORTH CAROLINA; CHIEF

RON CAMPURCIANI, in his official and individual capacity,

FAUST, in her individual and official capacity; CAPTAIN BUCKY GOODALE, in his official and individual capacity; and TRACEY JEROME, in her official and individual capacity,

NOW COME Defendants Town of Mooresville, Chief Ron Campurciani, Assistant Chief Rhonda Faust, Captain Bucky Goodale, and Tracey Jerome (collectively “Defendants”), by and through undersigned counsel, and respectfully submit this Reply in support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. Defendants address only matters newly raised by Plaintiff’s Response to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss in Lieu of an Answer and will explain why Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss should be granted.

I.

Plaintiff has Failed to Plead Individual Claims Against Defendants Jerome and Goodale. 4912-3412-6009, v. 1

Plaintiff argues he has sufficiently stated a claim against Defendant Goodale for First Amendment Retaliation because Defendant Goodale submitted a complaint to various third-party entities on January 22, 2026, accusing Plaintiff of inappropriate or retaliatory treatment of Mooresville-affiliated cadets. (D.E. 1 ¶ 127-38). The purported protected speech occurred nearly a year prior. (Id. ¶ 67). Plaintiff’s conclusory allegation that Defendant Goodale’s complaint was in retaliation for his alleged protected speech nearly a year prior, without any further allegation of fact to support such a connection, falls short of the requirements under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) and instead constitute “naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).

Plaintiff’s argument for individual liability against Defendant Jerome is based upon the allegation that she affirmed the discipline imposed upon Plaintiff. (D.E. 1 ¶ 123). Plaintiff argues that Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791 (4th Cir. 1994) and Slakan v. Porter, 737 F.2d 368 (4th Cir. 1984) stand for the proposition that a final decision maker who affirms unconstitutional discipline after being presented with constitutional concerns is personally involved in the deprivation. (D.E. 6). Neither case holds what Plaintiff argues. Instead, both cases indicate when a supervisor can be liable under § 1983 for actions of their subordinates, which is exactly how Plaintiff is attempting to hold Defendant Jerome. Such a showing requires the presence of “deliberate indifference” which is not pled here. Shaw, 13 F.3d at 799. Thus, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against Defendant Jerome individually.

II.

Plaintiff’s First Amendment Claim Fails a. Plaintiff did not Engage in Protected Speech. Plaintiff argues that use of his personal Snapchat account to communicate information about a Special Response Team operation outside his chain of command after the operation 4912-3412-6009, v. 1 ended constitutes speech as a private citizen because there was no order or policy requiring him or prohibiting from engaging in the speech. Simply engaging in speech outside the normal channels of employment without authorization to do so does not automatically mean the speech was made as a private citizen. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 420, 126 S.Ct. 1951, 164 L.Ed.2d 689 (2006) (indicating that whether an employee speaks at the workplace or outside of it is not dispositive on whether he spoke as a private citizen). Plaintiff sent a message to another law enforcement officer “directly reflecting” what SRT personnel had already discussed during the operation and provided information that only a member participating in the operation in question would have had. (D.E. 1 ¶ 85-86). Such communication is made as an employee of the Town, not as a private citizen. See Holland v. Rimmer, 25 F.3d 1251, 1255-56 (4th Cir. 1994) (speech by a supervisor disciplining employees is not speech as a private citizen because it constituted “in-house communications between employees speaking as employees.”).

Plaintiff’s speech was also not concerning the public. In his Response, Plaintiff argues the cases cited by Defendants are distinguishable because Plaintiff was discussing a jurisdictionally sensitive police operation conducted in another agency’s territory rather than personal employment grievances. Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that he communicated the deputy’s boss “was going to be angry.” (D.E. 1 ¶ 85). Plaintiff does not allege he communicated any jurisdictional concerns. Rather, he argues now in his lawsuit that is what the communication was intended to do. “Speech involves a matter of public concern when it involves an issue of social, political, or other interest to a community.” Kirby v. City of Elizabeth City, 388 F.3d 440, 446 (4th Cir. 2004). Messaging an employee in another agency that his boss is going to be angry, using an application that automatically deletes the message after it is sent does not suggest Plaintiff’s communication was intended to relay a public concern. 4912-3412-6009, v. 1

Plaintiff made no efforts to communicate his concerns to the public in any manner. See Holland, 25 F.3d at 1255-56 (the court looked to whether the employee was speaking out to the public to determine whether the matter was of public concern); Kurtz v. Vickrey, 855 F.2d 723, 727 (11th Cir. 1988) (an employee’s effort to communicate to the public is relevant in determining whether the speech is of a public concern).

b. Plaintiff’s Interest in Speaking is Outweighed by the Town’s Interest in

Efficient Service. Like many of Plaintiff’s arguments contained in his Response, he provides no legal authority to support his position that the Town’s interests in efficient service are do not outweigh his interest in telling an employee of another agency information about an operation. Under Plaintiff’s theory, since he is a support officer on SRT, he can communicate information about any operation to anyone outside his department as long as the operation is complete and he did not disclose tactics or sensitive information about the operation. A police department, and SRT specifically, operate in dangerous situations where members of the team and department must be able to rely upon each other.

Courts “must take into account the context of the employee’s speech and the extent to which it disrupts the operation and mission of the institution.” Ridpath v. Bd. of Governors Marshall Univ., 447 F.3d 292, 319 (4th Cir. 2006). The public employer does not need to prove actual disruption, “only that an adverse effect was ‘reasonably to be apprehended.’” Maciariello v. Sumner, 973 F.2d 295, 300 (4th Cir. 1992) (quoting Jurgensen v. Fairfax Cnty., 745 F.2d 868, 879 (4th Cir. 1984)). “This has particular resonance when law enforcement agencies are involved because ‘police officials are entitled to impose more restrictions on speech than other public employers because a police force is paramilitary—discipline is demanded, and freedom must be correspondingly denied.’” Billioni v. Bryant, 998 F.3d 572, 577 (4th Cir. 2021) (quoting 4912-3412-6009, v. 1 Brickey v. Hall, 828 F.3d 298, 304 (4th Cir. 2016)). “[G]reater latitude is afforded to police department officials in dealing with dissension in their ranks.” Maciariello, 973 F.2d at 300. The Plaintiff here created conflict between two departments when he reached out to the Sheriff’s deputy, despite being informed the jurisdictional concerns had been addressed. The Town had a legitimate interest in ensuring their officers are not engaging in such conduct and attempting to create dissension amongst agencies surrounding a criminal operation.

Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment Stigma-Plus Claim Fails. a. The Notation in Plaintiff’s Personnel File. The notation in Plaintiff’s personnel file that he “showed guilt” by deleting snapchat messages is not false and was not made public by the Town, as required by Sciolino. Sciolino v. City of Newport News, Va., 480 F.3d 642, 646 (4th Cir. 2007). Plaintiff alleges in his Complaint that he used an application to send the message which “automatically expire.” (D.E. 1 ¶¶ 94, 117-18). It is unclear how Plaintiff can say he did not intentionally delete the messages when he intentionally used an application that deletes messages once they are sent. Such a claim is akin to arguing that a person does not cause the damage resulting from a motor vehicle accident, the car does. While admittedly not alleged, presumably Plaintiff had other methods of communicating with the deputy in question, yet chose to use a medium that deleted the messages once sent. A notation indicating he “showed guilt” by deleting snapchat messages is not false simply because Plaintiff did not manually delete the messages. He still caused the messages to be deleted.

More importantly, Plaintiff has not plausibly pled such information was or could be publicized. Plaintiff conveniently ignores the North Carolina State Statute which makes it a misdemeanor to disclose the information Plaintiff claims to be subject to public inspection. N.C.G.S. § 160A-168(e). The Town cannot disclose the subject information without committing