Reply to Response to [38] Motion to Dismiss Count I of the Complaint Filed by Massachusetts Institute of Technology. (Bhabha, Ishan)

Michel DeGraff,

Plaintiff, v. Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Tim Walberg in his official capacity as the Chairman of the House Committee on Education & Workforce; and The House Committee on Education & Workforce,

Defendants.

Case No. 1:26-cv-11488-ADB Motion for Leave to File Reply Brief Granted on July 8, 2026 REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY’S MOTION TO DISMISS COUNT I OF THE COMPLAINT i TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .......................................................................................................... ii ARGUMENT .................................................................................................................................. 1

I.

The Opposition Confirms That MIT Is Not a State Actor. ................................................. 1 A.

The Complaint Does Not Plausibly Allege State Action. ....................................... 1 B.

DeGraff’s Attempt to Reframe His First Amendment Claim Fails. ....................... 3 C.

DeGraff Lacks Standing. ........................................................................................ 8 D.

DeGraff Fails to State a Claim Under Vullo. ........................................................ 11 E.

If the Court Deems the Congressional Defendants Immune From Suit, Rule 19 Requires That Count I Be Dismissed Against MIT As Well. ...................................................................................................................... 13 II.

Leave to Amend Should Be Denied. ................................................................................. 15

Air Sunshine, Inc. v. Carl, 663 F.3d 27 (1st Cir. 2011) ...................................................................8 Backpage.com v. Dart, 807 F.3d 229 (7th Cir. 2015) ....................................................................10 Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963) ..........................................................10, 11, 12 Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) .....................................................................8 Benavidez v. Gunnell, 722 F.2d 615 (10th Cir. 1983) .....................................................................3 Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982) ..........................................................................1, 4, 6, 7, 14 Bruni v. City of Pittsburgh, 824 F.3d 353 (3d Cir. 2016) ................................................................3 Caldwell v. Cambra, 802 F. Supp. 3d 8 (D. Mass. 2025) ................................................................4 City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983) .........................................................................10 Cornelio v. Connecticut, 32 F.4th 160 (2d Cir. 2022) .....................................................................3 Doe v. University of Sciences, 961 F.3d 203 (3d Cir. 2020) ............................................................2 FDA v. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine, 602 U.S. 367 (2024) .................................................10 Fakhreddine v. University of Pennsylvania, No. 24-cv-1034, 2025 WL 345089

(E.D. Pa. Jan. 30, 2025), aff’d as modified, No. 25-1290, 2026 WL 74593 (3d Cir. Jan. 9, 2026) ..................................................................................................................2, 10 Frith v. Whole Foods Market, Inc., 38 F.4th 263 (1st Cir. 2022) ................................................ 7-8 Gray v. Evercore Restructuring L.L.C., 544 F.3d 320 (1st Cir. 2008) ..........................................15 Hatch v. Department for Children, Youth & Their Families, 274 F.3d 12 (1st Cir.

2001) ........................................................................................................................................15 Hochendoner v. Genzyme Corp., 823 F.3d 724 (1st Cir. 2016) ..........................................9, 11, 15 Khalil v. Trustees of Columbia University in the City of New York, No. 25-cv-2079,

2026 WL 775813 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2026) .....................................................4, 5, 6, 7, 11, 13 Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972) .................................................................................................10 Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982).....................................................................6, 8 Manhattan Community Access Corp. v. Halleck, 587 U.S. 802 (2019) ..................................2, 6, 8

iii

Mead v. Independence Association, 684 F.3d 226 (1st Cir. 2012) ..................................................3 National Rifle Association of America v. Vullo, 602 U.S. 175 (2024) ....................................11, 12 Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244 (1963) .......................................................................2 Republic of Philippines v. Pimentel, 553 U.S. 851 (2008) ............................................................14 Republican National Committee v. Pelosi, No. 22-5123, 2022 WL 4349778 (D.C.

Cir. Sept. 16, 2022) ..................................................................................................................15 Republican National Committee v. Pelosi, 602 F. Supp. 3d 1 (D.D.C. 2022),

vacated as moot, No. 22-5123, 2022 WL 4349778 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 16, 2022) .......................15 RNR Enterprises, Inc. v. SEC, 122 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 1997)............................................................12 Rodríguez-Reyes v. Molina-Rodríguez, 711 F.3d 49 (1st Cir. 2013) ...............................................3 Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330 (2016) ...................................................................................9 Sullivan v. Carrick, 888 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1989) ................................................................................9 Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149 (2014) ..............................................................10 Sutton v. Providence St. Joseph Medical Center, 192 F.3d 826 (9th Cir. 1999) ...........................13 Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP, 591 U.S. 848 (2020) ........................................................................12 United States v. AT&T Co., 567 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1977) ..........................................................15 United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787 (1966) ............................................................................3, 5, 6

Holding Campus Leaders Accountable and Confronting Antisemitism: Hearing

Before the H. Comm. on Educ. & the Workforce, 118th Cong. (2023) .....................................7

Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(1)(B) ............................................................................................................14 Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(1)(B)(i) .........................................................................................................14

DeGraff’s opposition brief confirms his Complaint does not state a First Amendment claim against MIT. Unable to defend the state-action theory alleged in the Complaint—that MIT, a private institution, became a state actor “by virtue of … having furnished … documents to the Committee,” Compl. ¶190—DeGraff changes course. He now says that alleged personnel actions reflect MIT’s “anticipatory complian[ce]” with the Committee’s unstated wishes. Opp. 7. That is not the theory of constitutional injury alleged in the Complaint, and it fails regardless. There are no well-pleaded factual allegations creating a plausible inference that any such personnel actions resulted from an exercise of the Committee’s “coercive power” such that they “must in law be deemed to be that of the State.” Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982).

The opposition’s remaining arguments fare no better. DeGraff’s standing theory fails for the same reasons—it improperly recasts state-law employment injuries as First Amendment harms allegedly traceable to implied Committee pressure. Nor does the opposition’s cursory discussion of the actual theories of harm alleged in the Complaint explain how generalized claims of chill, speculative fears of future harassment by third parties, or the possible disclosure of unspecified records suffice to create standing here. On the merits, DeGraff does not allege the required threat of adverse government action against MIT or address how MIT, as the victim of the alleged coercion, can be the proper defendant under Vullo. And having insisted that MIT’s actions were compelled by the Committee, he cannot avoid the conclusion that Rule 19 does not permit his claim to proceed against MIT in the Committee’s absence. Count I should be dismissed with prejudice.

I.

The Opposition Confirms That MIT Is Not a State Actor. A.

The Complaint Does Not Plausibly Allege State Action. DeGraff’s opposition brief states the correct standard: The Complaint must be dismissed if